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STATUTORY CAPS ON DAMAGES
AND THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell'
In the mid 1970s there arose in this country a growing concern that
our tort system of compensation was facing a crisis in the area of medical
malpractice liability.2 In the face of growing insurance premiums, due in
part to the increasing number of damage awards in malpractice suits, there
was a growing fear that quality health care was at risk. Insurers, who had
been underwriting malpractice insurance policies, began to refuse coverage
because of decreasing profits. 3 There was widespread fear among health
care professionals and legislatures that physicians, finding insurance coverage
either impossible to obtain or prohibitively expensive, would abandon high
risk fields, thereby lowering the overall quality of health care. 4 In response
to this perceived crisis forty-three states enacted medical malpractice leg-
islation. 5 Although the various statutes employed a variety of mechanisms 6
designed to curtail this crisis, almost all faced constitutional attacks on
various grounds.7 And, although some survived these attacks, others per-
ished.' The purpose of this Note is to explore the death of one such statute
1. 243 Kan. 333, 757 P.2d 251 (1988).
2. See Danzor, The Effects of Tort Reform on the Frequency and Severity
of Medical Malpractice Claims, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 413, 413-14 (1987).
3. Bell, 243 Kan. at -, 757 P.2d at 254 (citing Comment, Caps, "Crisis,"
and Constitutionality - Evaluating the 1986 Kansas Medical Malpractice Legislation,
35 U. KAN. L. REv. 763, 765 (1987)).
4. See generally Comment, Caps and Constitutionality - Evaluating the 1986
Kansas Medical Malpractice Legislation, 35 U. KAN. L. REv. 763, 765 (1987).
5. Bell, Legislative Intrusions Into The Common Law of Medical Mal-
practice: Thought About the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability, 35 SYRACUSE L.
Ray. 939 n.1 (1984).
6. The mechanisms used include screening boards, damage limitations, elim-
ination of ad damnum clauses, modification of res ipsa loquitur, and the forced
time payments of future benefits.
7. The constitutional attacks include violations of the right to jury trial,
due process, equal protection, and the right to remedy by due course of law.
8. See Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231, 237 (Fla. 1980) (finding statute
violated due process clause of Florida Constitution); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H.
925, 940, 424 A.2d 825, 836 (1980) (finding that statutory caps on nonpecuniary
damages are unconstitutional); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 136 (N.D. 1978)
(finding statute unconstitutional on equal protection grounds); Boucher v. Jayerl,
459 A.2d 87, 94 (R.I. 1983) (finding that in the absence of a medical malpractice
crisis an equal protection violation existed).
1
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in a recent Kansas Supreme Court decision. Further, this Note will apply
the reasoning in that decision to a similar Missouri statute to determine
if it too is susceptible to attack on similar constitutional grounds.
In 1986 Kansas enacted three statutes designed to reduce the cost of
medical malpractice insurance and thereby stabilize the medical insurance
market.9 The statutes placed a cap on total recovery in medical malpractice
actions at $1 million and limited recovery for non-economic damages to
$250,000.10 In the event a jury were to find damages in excess of the
statutory limit, the judge would reduce the amount accordingly." The
statutes also required that any recovery for future loss be reduced to present
value and invested in a state-owned annuity, which would in turn pay out
benefits over a number of years.' 2 Lastly, the statutes provided a "pinhole
provision" whereby a plaintiff could petition the court for a higher statutory
limit if the jury award exceeded the initial limitation. 3 If the petition was
successful the excess would be paid by a state-run insurance company, as
long as it did not exceed $3 million.' 4 For example, if a jury verdict resulted
in total damages of $6 million, the defendant would only be liable for $1
million, and the state would pay an additional $3 million. The end result
was that the plaintiff would only recover $4 million of the jury's original
$6 million finding.'
In Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell a group of malpractice
victims sued seeking a declaratory judgment that the statutes violated various
provisions of the Kansas Constitution. 6 The coalition claimed that the
statute violated the right to trial by jury,17 the right to remedy by due
course of law, 8 as well as the right to equal protection.' 9 In ruling the
statute unconstitutional, the Kansas Supreme Court found that setting caps
9. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3407, -3409, -3411 (Supp. 1987)
10. Id. § 60-3407.
11. Id.
12. Id. § 60-3409.
13. Id. § 60-3411.
14. Id.
15. High damage awards in a medical malpractice actions are relatively rare.
Statistics from the legislative hearings on these Kansas statutes indicate that in 1987
there were 21 medical malpractice cases in Kansas and only one verdict exceeded$1 million. Also, over the last ten years only fifteen persons would have been
affected by the caps on recovery. See Bell, 243 Kan. at - , 757 P.2d at 256.
On a national level, in 1984 the American insurance industry closed approximately
73,500 malpractice claims against 103,300 health care providers. Fewer than one
half of settled claims led to compensatory payment. The median payment made
was $18,000, and the largest single payment in 1984 was $2.5 million. See Gellhorn,
Medical Malpractice Litigation (U.S.) - Medical Compensation (N.Z.), 73 CORNELL
L. Rnv. 170, 171 (1988).
16. Bell, 243 Kan. at -, 757 P.2d at 253.
17. KAN. CoNsT. art. I, § 5.
18. Id. § 18.
19. Id. § 1.
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on the amount of recovery and requiring annuity payments for future
economic harm did indeed violate a plaintiff's right to remedy by due
course of law and the right to trial by jury.20 The court pointed out that
limiting the liability of the state-run insurance company was well within
the authority of the state, but limiting the liability of potential tortfeasors
in the manner which the statute dictated violated the state's constitution. 21
The court in Bell recognized that because the statute acted as a "com-
pulsory, preestablished remittitur," the determination of damages would
be prospective, and therefore an infringement upon the fact finding purpose
of a jury.2 The court noted that while a normal remittitur also infringes
upon such findings, it is only applied pursuant to a clear legal standard. a
Indeed, only when the level of the award "shock[s] the conscience of the
court" and the plaintiff is given the option of accepting a reduction or
opting for a new trial is a remittitur permitted. 24 The court further noted
that there is no exact, mathematical relationship between nonpecuniary
damages such as pain and suffering and a jury-determined award. 2s In
fact, because of this impossibility of precise determination we allow the
jury to decide the question to begin with.26 The only way to determine an
acceptable level of compensation in such circumstances is to allow a cross
section of society to judge what fair compensation is. Infringing on the
jury's determination of such facts therefore infringes on the right to trial
by jury.27
At common law, and according to the case law of Kansas, a party is
not entitled to a jury trial in actions that were historically equitable. 28
Parties seeking injunctive relief, specific performance, foreclosure, and other
equitable remedies are not entitled to a trial by jury. 29 However, a jury
trial is a matter of right if a party seeks a legal remedy such as damages.30
The Bell court noted that it would be illogical for a jury, existing for the
very reason that damages were claimed, to be denied the ability to determine
those damages without the possibility of its finding being statutorily re-
duced.3"
20. Bell, 243 Kan. at - , 757 P.2d at 256-64.
21. Id. at , 757 P.2d at 256-64.
22. Id. at , 757 P.2d at 260.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. (quoting Domann v. Pence, 183 Kan. 135, 141, 325 P.2d 321, 325
(1958)).
26. Id.
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The court did recognize that a legislature can modify the right to jury
trial in some circumstances.32 The legislature, through its power to change
the common law, can modify the right to jury trial as long as there is
no violation of due process, and the modification is "reasonably necessary
S. . to promote the general welfare of the people .. . . " One way to
prevent such a due process violation is for the legislature to create an
adequate substitute remedy. 34 The court distinguished two previous statutes
which modified common law rights of recovery, but provided this substi-
tution.35 In a prior ruling on worker's compensation legislation, which
statutorily limited recovery, the court found no due process violation because
the workers were allowed, prior to injury, to choose between the common
law remedy and the statutory remedy.36 Although subsequent changes in
the statute removed this choice, the court still did not find a violation in
that the statute provided an adequate substitute remedy in the form of a
reduced standard of proof.37
Likewise, the court distinguished the Kansas Automobile Injury Re-
habilitation Act.38 Under this statute nonpecuniary damages were not re-
coverable at all in circumstances of nonserious injury.39 A prior decision
dealing with this statute found no violation of the right to jury trial because
the plaintiff "received a sufficient quid pro quo" in the form of prompt
payment under the no-fault insurance provision of the statute.40 The current
malpractice legislation, however, did not provide an adequate substitute
remedy because the plaintiff received nothing substantial in return for the
limitation on the right to recovery. 4' The defendant in the case had argued
that the plaintiff would receive benefits in the form of lower costs, wider
availability of health-care, and a guarantee of recovery due to the statute
providing malpractice insurance.42 The court pointed out that these benefits
did not make up for the loss to the plaintiff because physicians have always
been required, by state law, to carry malpractice insurance. 43 Also, the
benefits in the form of lower costs or increased availability of health care
would be "minuscule" compared with the loss to a "terribly injured"
32. Id.
33. Id. at __ , 757 P.2d at 259 (quoting Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan.
589, 599, 522 P.2d 1291, 1300 (1974)).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. (citing Shade v. Cement Co., 93 Kan. 257, 144 P.2d 249 (1914)).
37. Id. (citing Rajala v. Doresky, 233 Kan. 440, 441, 661 P.2d 1251, 1253
(1983)).
38. KAN. STAT. AN. § 40-3101 (1986).
39. Id.
40. Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589, 599, 522 P.2d 1291, 1300 (1974).
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plaintiff who would be denied damages above the statutory limit.44
The Bell court, however, did not draw another important distinction
between the automobile injury statute and the malpractice legislation. The
current statute places a statutory limit on recovery for nonpecuniary harm,
while the auto statute eliminates it altogether. 45 If recovery for pain and
suffering is simply not allowed, then the jury never deliberates on that
issue. Arguably, if the jury does not decide an issue, then no violation of
the right to jury trial could occur. On the other hand, as to a statutory
limitation on damages made prior to trial, which potentially changes a
jury's findings, a violation of the right to jury trial can occur. A legislative
elimination of nonpecuniary recovery arguably does not violate a consti-
tutional right to jury trial, while a statutory limit on such recovery does.46
Section 18 of the Kansas Bill of Rights provides that all persons "shall
have remedy by due course of law".47 The Kansas Supreme Court has
defined this to mean the right to "the reparation for injury, ordered by
a tribunal having jurisdiction, in due course of procedure and after a fair
hearing." '48 Moreover, the right to remedy had been held to include the
right to a full remedy for all injuries. 49 The court in Bell pointed out that
"there can be little doubt" that the malpractice statute impairs the right
to a remedy in placing statutory caps on economic or non-economic loss.50
It should be noted that providing the necessary resources to pay a
judgment is not the same thing as the right to a remedy.5 1 There is no
constitutional guarantee that a defendant will have the assets to pay a
judgment. What is guaranteed is the right to a means of redress of injuries
resulting from another's negligence.5 2 In this case, the legislature is free to
limit the liability of the state-run insurance program; but limiting a plaintiff's
44. Id. at __ , 757 P.2d at 259-60.
45. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3101 (1986).
46. Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 789 (W.D. Va. 1986).
47. KAN. CONST. art. I, § 18.
48. 243 Kan. at -, 757 P.2d 251, 260 (quoting Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68
Kan. 670, 75 P. 1041 (1904)).
49. Id. at -, 757 P.2d at 262 (citing Neely v. St. Francis Hosp., 192
Kan. 716, 391 P.2d 155 (1964)).
50. Id. at __, 757 P.2d at 263. The pinhole provision was also seen to
be a violation because it was simply a higher arbitrary limit. Furthermore, the
requirement that future damages be reduced to present value and paid out of a
state owned annuity also violated the right to a full remedy. Instead of giving the
plaintiff the normal lump-sum judgment, the statute forced the plaintiff to relinquish
control over his money. Such a limitation on a common law remedy submits the
plaintiff to risks he would not otherwise have to incur. An insurance company (a
likely seller of annuities) could default on the annuity contract, thereby leaving
the plaintiff with nothing, or forcing him to pursue another lawsuit. Id.
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remedy by capping recovery is potentially unconstitutional because a means
of redress for certain injuries is impaired or eliminated.53
Like the right to jury trial, however, legislatures are allowed to modify
remedies to further public interests.5 4 Judicial review of such a modification
requires compliance with due process in that the legislature must again
provide an adequate substitute remedy. 5 And, as in the right to jury trial,
an adequate "quid pro quo" can provide this substitution and thereby
abrogate any due process violation.5 6 The defendants in Bell argued that
since the statute lowered the cost of health care and stabilized the insurance
market, more doctors would choose to continue practicing instead of aban-
doning the field due to high insurance costs.5 7 This in turn would insure
the continued availability of quality health care to malpractice victims,
thereby providing the quid pro quo in lieu of any infringement of their
right to recover.58 The court, quite correctly, pointed out that the victims
would not need this continued health care had the physicians not been
negligent in the first place. 9
Medical malpractice statutes which limit recovery for damages are also
challenged on the basis of equal protection violations.6 It is arguable that
by placing a cap on the damages recoverable in a medical malpractice
action, the plaintiff does not enjoy the same rights as a plaintiff who is
injured by some other means. 6' Also, a plaintiff with damages below the
statutory limit is treated differently than the plaintiff with more serious
injuries resulting in damages above the statutory limit. Generally, for a
statute to comply with an equal protection clause, it must treat individuals
which it affects with equanimity. 62 The Bell court, having invalidated the
statute on due process grounds, declined to decide the equal protection
issue.63
When considering the constitutionality of any statute on equal protection
or due process grounds, a court must first determine the proper standard
53. Id. at -, 757 P.2d at 256, 263-64.
54. Id. at -, 757 P.2d at 260 (citing Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589,
522 P.2d 1291 (1974)).
55. Id. at , 757 P.2d at 260.




60. See, e.g., Jones v. Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399(1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp., 63
Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d
657 (1977); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
61. Note, Judicial Review of Medical Malpractice Legislation, 20 SUProLK
U.L. REv. 523, 526 (1986).
62. Id. at 525-26.
63. Bell, 243 Kan. at -, 757 P.2d at 264.
[Vol. 54
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of review.64 The normal rule is that if statute creates a suspect classification, 6
or deals with a fundamental right, 66 the court will subject the statute to
strict scrutiny. 67 Legislation subjected to this strict standard of review rarely
survives. 6 To meet this high standard the statute must further an important
state interest and provide the least injurious means of advancing that
interest. 69 To date no court has employed the strict scrutiny standard to
invalidate statutes involving medical malpractice legislation. 70 Malpractice
plaintiffs are not the type of suspect class that would justify the higher
standard, and courts have not considered the rights that this legislation
endangers to be fundamental. 71
If there is no suspect classification or threat to a fundamental right,
the court will generally employ a rational relationship standard of review.
72
Under this standard the court will defer to legislative judgment and not
invalidate a statute as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest and does not clearly violate the constitution. 73 In Fein v. Permanente
Medical Group, the Supreme Court of California ruled that a cap on non-
economic damages was rationally related to a legitimate state interest in
regulating the medical industry and preventing meritless claims.7 4 By placing
a cap on nonpecuniary damages, the Fein court reasoned that the state's
goals of insuring adequate health care and lowering the cost of malpractice
insurance were furthered without unduly infringing upon the plaintiff's
rights. 75 Furthermore, the statute provided a sufficient quid pro quo in the
form of insuring resources for malpractice victims by reducing the extent
64. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287-305 (1978)
(Supreme Court states that the appropriate standard of review must be determined
before ruling on equal protection challenges).
65. Suspect classification will arise if the class is "saddled with such disa-
bilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated
to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
66. A fundamental right is defined as a right which is "explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution." Id. at 33.
67. See Rodriquez, 411 U.S. at 40 (strict standard of review applied only
to laws creating suspect classifications or impinging on constitutional rights).
68. See Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAuv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972)
(stating that the strict scrutiny test is strict in theory and fatal in fact).
69. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
70. Comment, The Constitutional Attack on Virginia's Medical Malpractice
Cap: Equal Protection and the Right to Jury Trial, 22 U. RiCH. L. REv. 95, 102
n.48 (1987).
71. Id. at 102.
72. See, e.g., Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d
665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985) (en banc).
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to which non-meritorious claims would consume these resources. 76
Other courts have employed an intermediate standard when reviewing
the constitutionality of various statutes.7 This so-called "means focus test"
dictates that the court actually inquire into the legislative purposes for
enacting the statute and make a judicial determination of whether the
legislation is suited for the accomplishment of the proposed goals." A
court applying this standard in the context of medical malpractice legislation
would inquire as to whether there actually was a crisis which needed such
a legislative solution, and whether this particular statute succeeded in dealing
with the crisis. State courts applying this intermediate level of review to
malpractice legislation generally find the statutes unconstitutional.79 Other
commentators claim that this intermediate standard should be applied in
the context of malpractice legislation because the perceived malpractice
crisis either no longer exists or never existed in the first place. 0 Furthermore,
the effectiveness of such statutes should be opened up to judicial inquiry
because, arguably, they have not achieved the goals which their proponents
envisioned."
Like most other states, Missouri has enacted legislation designed to
abrogate the perceived crisis in medical malpractice litigation. 2 Before
considering the current statute, it is necessary to examine past Missouri
statutes and their treatment by Missouri courts. In 1976 legislation was
introduced providing a number of mechanisms designed to deal with ex-
panding liability in the medical industry.83 The statute first provided for
pretrial screening panels which, in theory, were to encourage settlement
and weed out non-meritorious claims8 4 Before filing any suit seeking dam-
ages from a health care provider, a plaintiff had to first submit the case
to the screening panel for review.85 Parties were free to reject the recom-
mendations of the panel with no adverse effects on their subsequent right
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971).
78. Reed, 404 U.S. at 75-76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
79. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 935, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
80. Comment, Medical Malpractice Statutes: Special Protection for a Priv-
ileged Few?, 12 N. Ky. L. REv. 295, 338 (1985).
81. Id.
82. Mo. Rnv. STAT. §§ 538.010-.080 (1978) (repealed 1984), Mo. REv. STAT.
§§ 538.205-.300 (1986).
83. Id. §§ 538.010-.080. The 1976 legislation provided for a new medical
malpractice statute of limitations, pretrial screening boards, and the prohibition of
dollar amounts in medical malpractice ad damnum clauses. Terry, Missouri's Mal-
practice Concord, 51 Mo. L. REv. 457, 459 (1986).
84. Terry, supra note 83, at 459.
85. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 538.010-.080 (1977) (repealed 1984).
[Vol. 54
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to proceed to trial.16 Once at trial the panels findings were not binding
on the jury and the parties were prohibited from introducing into evidence
what those findings actually were.87
The Missouri Supreme Court, however, found that requiring pretrial
screening trials was unconstitutional. In State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon
Memorial Hospital v. Gaertner, the court found that the statute violated
a plaintiff's right of access to the courts. 8  In Judge Simeone's concurring
opinion, he stated that "any substantial impediment barring access to the
judicial system is detrimental and contrary to the provisions of the Missouri
Constitution." 89 Since the statute required this procedure before access to
the courts was allowed, the review boards were deemed unconstitutional.9
In distinguishing a New York case which upheld such panels, the majority
opinion noted that the review boards in that particular case were convened
after the actual court proceedings had begun; therefore, the panels did not
impede access to the courts.91
The dissent in Gaertner, however, explicitly argued for the adoption
of a rational relationship standard of review and found that such a re-
quirement should not be ruled unconstitutional. 92 It stated that "an act of
the legislature is presumed to be valid and will not be declared unconsti-
tutional unless it clearly and undoubtedly contravenes some constitutional
provision". 93 In recognizing that a medical malpractice crisis does exist,
the dissent would have deferred to the legislature on how to deal with
such a crisis, as long as the method used was not a blatant violation of
the constitution. 94 Since these review boards were simply analogous to a
pre-trial conference, in that their recommendations were not binding on
the jury or admissible as evidence, the impediment on access to the courts
was in fact minimal.95 The state's interest in abrogating the crisis "certainly
justified" this minimal intrusion.96
Likewise, the Gaertner dissent pointed out that the right to jury trial
would remain inviolate if a review panel was required. 7 Since the recom-
mendations of the review board were not binding on the jury the statute
86. Id. §§ 538.045-.050.
87. Id. § 538.050.
88. State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d
107, 110 (1979) (en banc).
89. Id. at 111.
90. Id. at 110.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 118 (Morgan, J. dissenting).
93. Id. at 117 (quoting Americans United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711 (Mo.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976)).
94. Id. at 117-18.
95. Id. at 113.
96. Id. at 118.
97. Id. at 113.
9
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only created a "pre-condition" to a plaintiff's exercise of his right to jury
trial.9 Furthermore, the dissent stated that "[tihe right of access to the
courts and trial by jury is not an unfettered right that exists over and above
all other rights and remedies. The legislature must be free to provide new
remedies ... to meet new crises in these changing times." 99
A second mechanism which the 1976 legislation employed was a new
statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases.'0 Normally, in a neg-
ligence action a plaintiff has five years from the time of the negligent act
to file his suit. 10 Under the new statute of limitation, however, the plaintiff
had to file her action for medical malpractice within two years of the
negligent act, except when the negligence involved leaving foreign objects
in the body. 02 When objects are left in the body, the action had to be
brought within two years of discovery of the object. 03 The purpose of
such a reduction in the statute of limitations was to reduce the number
of claims actually filed, thereby easing the pressure on insurance companies
to increase their rates or abandon the medical insurance market." 4 Insurance
companies contend that the greater the period of time there is for a plaintiff
to bring a claim, the more difficult it is to actuarially predict the amount
of liquidity needed to meet future obligations. 05 Errors in such predictions
were leading to large losses as older instances of negligence gave rise to
current claims. 06
In Ross v. Kansas City General Hospital and Medical Center, the
plaintiff claimed that this new statute of limitations violated the equal
protection clause of the Missouri Constitution. 17 Since the statute does
treat differently those who have foreign objects left in their bodies and
those who do not, the plaintiff in the case argued that it deprived him
of equal protection. 08 Employing a rational relationship standard of review,
the Missouri Supreme Court concluded that the legislature was within its
authority to create such differential treatment.' 9 Since the discovery of
negligence is substantially less likely when foreign objects are left in the
body, a "rational legislature" could find that a longer statute of limitation
was needed for that particular class of victims." 0 Moreover, the court noted
98. Id.
99. Id. at 114.
100. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 516.105 (1978).
101. Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.120 (1952).
102. Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.105 (1978).
103. Id.
104. Comment, supra note 80, at 298-99.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Ross v. Kansas City Gen. Hosp., 608 S.W.2d 397, 398 (1980).
108. Id.
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that problems of proof, one justification for limiting the time period in
which a suit can be brought, are not as serious when the best evidence
of the negligence is still in the body."'
It is interesting to note that Ross only rejected the equal protection
argument on the basis that the legislature had a rational basis for treating
malpractice victims differently."2 The court did not address the issue of
whether the legislature had a rational basis for treating malpractice dif-
ferently from other victims of negligence. Since the normal statute of
limitations in a negligence case is five years, a viable equal protection
argument still exists. To determine if there is a rational basis for such a
distinction, a court would have to determine whether a medical malpractice
crisis actually exists. The court, quite notably, did not address this issue.
The current Missouri statute dealing with medical malpractice litigation
has a number of provisions designed to deal with this malpractice crisis.113
Included is a $350,000 cap on nonpecuniary damages. 114 One rationale for
such a limitation is that nonpecuniary damages are seen as the main cause
of inflated awards in malpractice litigation." 5 Likewise, nonpecuniary dam-
ages are seen as encouraging non-meritorious claims in that the possibility
of a substantial award for nonpecuniary damages can be the incentive to
pursue such a claim." 6 Furthermore, the lack of any mathematical certainty
on arriving at a level of compensation indicates that the figures are arbitrary
and therefore should be limited to prevent overcompensation.1 7
Other commentators feel that nonpecuniary damages are actually a
source of compensation for a plaintiff's attorney."" Since normally attor-
ney's fees are not recoverable as damages, a high contingent fee could cut
into a plaintiff's economic recovery." 9 Nonpecuniary damages are simply
viewed as a way of offsetting these large contingent fees. 20 Also, a juror,
aware of a substantial contingent fee, might be more likely to award a
larger amount for non-economic damages so as to insure that the plaintiff
is adequately compensated.
Although the $350,000 limit in Missouri's statute appears to be a
substantial sum, in many cases such a figure could be inadequate in
compensating for certain types of injuries.' 2' For instance, large recoveries
111. Id.
112. 608 S.W.2d 397, 399 (1980).
113. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 538.205-.306 (1986).
114. Id. § 538.210.
115. Terry, supra note 83, at 469.
116. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 163, 695 P.2d 665,
683, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 386 (1985).
117. Id.
118. DOBBS, REMEDHES § 8.1, at 550-51 (1973).
119. Id.
120. Id.
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often occur when newborn infants are injured through the negligence of
the delivering physician. In such a situation, $350,000 for the pain and
suffering of a lifetime is, arguably, less than adequate compensation.
2
Likewise, in the case of horrible disfigurement, compensation for humiliation
and embarrassment only comes through the award of nonpecuniary
damages.'2 Once again, $350,000, spread over an entire lifetime is perhaps
inadequate.
Irrespective of the adequacy of such a limit, there remains the question
of whether Missouri's limitations on such recovery can survive constitutional
scrutiny. A recent New Hampshire decision found similar damage caps to
be unconstitutional.'2 In Carson v. Maurer the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire applied an intermediate standard of review to a statute limiting
nonpecuniary damages.'2 In rejecting the strict standard, the court found
that the right to recover for personal injury was not fundamental. 2 6 Also,
the lack of any suspect classification counselled against the stricter standard
of review. 27 The court did not, however, adopt the rational relationship
standard. It viewed the right to recover for personal injuries as a "sub-
stantive right", thereby justifying an intermediate standard. '2 This standard
requires that the statute "be reasonable . . . and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation in order to satisfy state equal protection guarantees.' '129
Although insuring the availability of adequate health care was a legitimate
objective of the legislature, the court found that the statute did not bear
a close enough relation to those objectives to survive constitutional scru-
tiny. 30 A severely injured plaintiff, the court reasoned, would be denied
equal protection if the statute were enforced.' 3'
In contrast to the New Hampshire decision, the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, in ruling on the constitutionality of
a Virginia statute which also limited non-economic damages, found the
statute unconstitutional on slightly different grounds. In Boyd v Bulala,
the court, finding that the statute did not create a suspect classification
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
125. Id. at 932-33, 424 A.2d at 831.
126. Id. at 931-32, 424 A.2d at 830.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 932, 424 A.2d at 831 (citing State v. Scoville, 113 N.H. 161, 163,
304 A.2d 366, 369 (1973)).
130. Id. at 940-41, 424 A.2d at 836.
131. Id. at 941-42, 424 A.2d at 837. The Carson court stated that "it is
simply unfair and unreasonable to impose the burden of supporting the medical
care industry solely upon those persons who are most severely injured and therefore
most in need of compensation." Id.
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or infringe upon a fundamental right, used the rational relationship standard
of review. 132 In interpreting the Virginia Constitution, the federal court
found that past decisions had not considered the right to a full recovery
in tort a fundamental right.133 Furthermore, the court found that the
legislative means of maintaining adequate health care through damage caps
was a rational means of achieving such a goal; therefore it did not consider
the equal protection and due process clauses violated.1 34 The Boyd court
also noted that the lack of a "quid pro quo" did not provide the reason
for applying a heightened standard of review.1 35 The court noted that since
the United States Supreme Court had never created a quid pro quo re-
quirement, such analysis should not be used.136 Furthermore, the court
stated that damage caps were "classic" economic regulation which should
be upheld absent a suspect classification or a fundamental right. 137
Even though the Boyd court found no equal protection or due process
violations, it nevertheless found the statute unconstitutional. 138 The plaintiff
in the case had argued that the medical malpractice cap infringed upon
the right to trial by jury. 1 9 The court did indeed find that the statute
violated the right to jury trial in that the caps on nonpecuniary and pecuniary
damages created a legislative presumption that damages would never exceed
the statutory limit. 140 Because the caps were a "judgment predetermined
by the legislature", the statute was invalid. 141 The federal court, like the
Kansas Supreme Court in Bell, noted that-unlike an application of a
remittitur or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict-the enforcement of
the statutory limit on damages followed no proper legal standard. 42 In
upsetting a jury finding with a JNOV, the verdict is only reversed if "is
plainly contrary to or unsupported by evidence" .143 The court noted that
legislatures were free to limit the type of damages allowed, but they could
132. Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp 781 (W.D. Va. 1986).
133. Id. at 787. The court noted that such fundamental rights include freedom
of speech, the right to vote, the right to a fair trial, and the right to privacy.
134. Id. at 787-88.
135. Id. at 786.
136. Id. (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
438 U.S. 59 (1978)).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 790.
139. Id. at 785. In the federal courts the right to jury trial is guaranteed by
the seventh amendment. Although the due process clause of the United States
Constitution has not been applied to the seventh amendment, federal courts sitting
in diversity must enforce the right to jury trial. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958). The Eighth Circuit in Boyd, however, never
actually had to apply this rule because the Virginia Constitution, article I, section
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not prospectively disturb a jury's findings of fact.'" According to the Boyd
court, a legislature should be free to eliminate a recovery for certain types
of damages, such as pain and suffering; but once the right to collect for
these damages exists, a jury finding as to those findings must not be
violated. 45
The question now becomes whether Missouri's cap on non-economic
damages can survive these various attacks on the constitutionality of such
statutes. Since Missouri does not follow the "quid pro quo" analysis used
by Kansas courts, it appears that any attack will turn upon the standard
of review Missouri courts use. It is likely that they will use a rational
relationship standard since the right to recovery in negligence suits is not
viewed as fundamental.'"6 Likewise, the statute's unequal treatment of
plaintiffs is unlikely to create a suspect classification because a rational
legislature could find a crisis in the area of medical malpractice. A disparity
in treatment between those recovering in normal negligence suits and those
recovering for malpractice would therefore not give rise to an equal pro-
tection violation. Furthermore, in Strahler v. St. Luke's Hospital,47 both
Justice Welliver and Justice Blackmar indicated that it is not for the courts
to determine whether a crisis in the medical malpractice industry actually
exists.1' s Therefore, an attack on the statute on equal protection or due
process grounds is unlikely to prevail.
However, the statute might well be vulnerable to attack on other
constitutional grounds. The Missouri Constitution provides that the right
to jury trial shall remain inviolate. 49 If Missouri courts follow the same
reasoning as the Kansas Supreme Court and the 8th Circuit, the statute
would violate the right to trial by jury. A pre-established remittitur on
non-economic damages is indeed a disruption of a jury's findings. Once
recovery for such things as pain and suffering is allowed, an arbitrary
limit on the amount recoverable is potentially a prospective disruption of
a jury's findings. As such, it is a violation of a plaintiff's right to trial
by jury.
PAuL DAY
144. Id. at 789-90.
145. Id.
146. See Terry, supra note 83, at 485 (1986). See also Ross v. Kansas City
Gen. Hosp., 608 S.W.2d 107, 116-17 (1979).
147. 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
148. Id. at 14, 20 (Blackmar, J., and Welliver, J., dissenting).
149. Mo. CONSr. art. 1, § 22(a).
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